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Can a growing welfare state induce a regime switch in the growth rate of an econ-
omy? This paper constructs a dynamic political economy model of economic growth
and the welfare state in which both variables are non-linearly related and jointly en-
dogenous. Using a Markov switching framework over the period 1950-2001, we ﬁnd
that the structural decline in growth rates that several welfare state economies expe-
rienced during 1970-1975 are preceded by movements to a high welfare state regime.
This suggests that expanding welfare state regimes are associated with low economic
growth regimes, while contracting welfare state regimes are associated with high growth
regimes. However, we also ﬁnd that the structural decline in growth rates leads to a
downward structural break in the welfare state for many welfare state economies. This
suggests that declining growth regimes are associated with contracting welfare state
regimes, as lower growth forces politicians to cut the size of the welfare state. We also
report strong evidence that both expansion and contractions in the welfare state aﬀects
growth non-linearly. These results are able to characterize a predictable and general
pattern of welfare state–growth evolution.
Keywords: Welfare State, Structural Change, Regime Switching Models,
Positive Political Economy, Endogenous Growth.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: P16: Political Economy of
Capitalism; E62: Fiscal Policy; O40 Economic Growth; C22: Time Series Models.1 Introduction
In the late 1960’s – mid 1970’s, several of the world’s industrialized economies expe-
rienced a reduction in their growth rates. In a symposium devoted to the issue of long
run growth, Kahn (1992) notes that the potential rate of economic growth in industrial-
ized countries is substantially lower than what it was in the 1960’s. The structural-break in
growth is also conﬁrmed by Shigehara (1992) who ﬁnds that nearly all the OECD economies
experience a slowdown occurring between 1968 and 1975.
The most widely accepted cause of the growth slowdown in the US is a reduction in to-
tal factor productivity (Griliches, 1980; Nordhaus, 1982; Romer, 1987; Baumol et al.,1989),
a phenomenon now referred to as the productivity puzzle. Recently, a growing literature
has begun to focus on the growth implications of unproductive government spending, and
whether such expenditures oﬀer an alternative channel for structural breaks in growth
(see Levine and Renelt, 1992; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995;
Turnovsky and Fisher, 1995; Tanzi and Zee, 1997; Ghate and Zak, 2002; Romer, 2003). This
literature, more relevant to welfare state economies, posits two channels through which ﬁscal
choices induce structural breaks in the growth rate of an economy. First, unproductive gov-
ernment expenditures (government consumption and transfers) hinder growth because such
expenditures are a less-than-perfect substitute for private consumption in the aggregate
(or possibly even a complement). This makes private savings decline, aﬀecting investment
and growth in the long run. A related channel adds a political economy explanation to
declining investment and growth because of a rising welfare state. To wit, because politi-ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 3
cians determine government expenditures, ﬁscal ﬂows reﬂect political objectives (Ghate,
2003). Hence, political decisions have an important impact on the allocation of resources
(Ghate and Zak, 2002; Romer, 2003). This suggests that ﬁscal choices (e.g., higher transfer
spending) because of say, populist pressure, leads to a bloating of the welfare state. In the
long run, growth is aﬀected adversely because higher welfare state spending is ﬁnanced by
higher taxation which generates economic ineﬃciency (Lindbeck et al, 1994; OECD, 1994
a,b; Atkinson and Werner-Sinn, 1999; Ghate and Zak, 2002).
Barr (1992), Tanzi and Shucknecht (1997), and Stuart and Hansson (2003), document
the expansion of the public sector created by higher expenditures on redistribution in pub-
lic budgets in several countries. For instance, Barr (1992) shows that welfare spending
constitutes a higher proportion of GDP in all several countries since 1960, with spending
doubling in Netherlands and Sweden, and nearly tripling in Switzerland. Accordingly, Tanzi
and Schuknecht (1997, p. 399) write that “after World War II, and especially after 1960,
subsidies and transfers, especially in cash, (has been) the driving force behind government
growth.” Finally, Stuart and Hansson (2003) also report a substantial bloating of the wel-
fare state for several countries throughout the sixties, seventies, and upto the mid-eighties.
However, Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997, p. 399) also note that the 1980’s and 1990’s saw “ad-
ditional but small” increases in transfers and subsidies in several welfare state economies.
Similarly, Stuart and Hansson (2003) document that 1992 serves as a ‘peak year’, indicating
some sort of empirical limit to transfer and total spending across industrialized economies.
This paper utilizes the model of growth and the welfare state developed in Ghate andECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 4
Zak (2002) as a point of departure, and estimates the main predictions of this model. Our
analysis provides evidence attributing the structural decline in growth in nineteen welfare
state economies experienced during 1970-1975 to an upward structural shift in their welfare
states. Further, we also show that lower growth regimes induce a reduction in the welfare
state. The nineteen welfare state economies constitute the comparative welfare state dataset
(CWS) compiled by Huber, Ragin, and Stephen (1997). Cumulatively, these economies
constitute representatives from all of the welfare state models (Scandinavian, conservative-
corporatist, and laissez-faire).1 Our main ﬁnding is that the structural breaks in the growth
rate of several of the economies that we analyze can be attributed to a structural break in
the trend growth of the welfare state variable. We also ﬁnd that the incidence of structural
breaks and thresholds in the size of welfare state closely match the reforms enacted by
countries to curb the size of their welfare state. This suggests that a rise in the trend
growth rate of the welfare state oﬀers an alternative - though robust - explanation for the
structural decline in growth performance of these economies. Indeed, our model is able to
identify a predictable and general pattern of welfare state–growth evolution.
To test the mapping between structural breaks in the welfare state inducing structural
breaks in growth, we employ a Markov switching model along the lines of Hamilton (1989).
Our framework assumes the existence of two regimes with reference to growth and the wel-
fare state: a high economic growth and low economic growth regime; and a high (expanding)
1See Arts and Gelissen (2002) for a discussion surrounding the appropriate welfare state typology. Because
of the ambiguity surrounding this debate, our list is simply exhaustive, and does not compare the joint
dynamics of welfare state evolution across welfare state type. We also include Japan and Ireland which do
not ﬁt into these traditional categories.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 5
welfare state and low (contracting) welfare state regime. We measure economic growth by
real GDP growth. Our measure of the welfare state follows Ghate and Zak (2002): we
deﬁne the size of the welfare state as the ratio of real transfer spending to real outlays on
public investment. Deﬁning the welfare state in this manner allows us to examine the size
of the welfare state per ‘dollar’ of productive government spending. Hence, a growing wel-
fare state can either be driven by one of two factors: an increase in real transfer spending
relative to public investment, or a reduction in public investment relative to a given level
of transfer spending.2 We deﬁne the growth rate as a negative break in the trend function
of the growth process.3 Our analysis leads to several interesting results.
First, we ﬁnd that the representative evolution of the welfare state across our cross-
country sample over 1960-2001 follows a non-linear (logistical) growth pattern. More specif-
ically, we ﬁnd that the welfare state initially grows at a slow rate, but slightly faster than the
growth rate of output, but then grows rapidly following the ﬁrst structural break. We refer
to this stage as the expansionary stage of the welfare state. Over time however, the welfare
state ﬁnally reverts back to a lower trend growth rate after a second structural break. We
r e f e rt ot h i sa st h econtractionary stage of the welfare state. Our analysis allows us to
identify three characteristic periods of welfare state behavior: two regimes corresponding to
slow economic growth and one corresponding to high economic growth. We then ask how
expansions and contractions in the welfare state generate low and high growth regimes.
2Adding government consumption to transfer spending does not alter the empirical results of the model.
Hence, we omit it from the analysis.
3Ben-David and Papell (1998) also attempt to characterize the breakpoints associated with growth rates
for several OECD countries. However, the diﬀerence between Ben-David and Papell (1998) and our model
is that while they assume a deterministic trend, we assume a stochastic trend.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 6
Second, the non-linear and jointly endogenous relationship between economic growth
and the welfare state identiﬁes the intuition behind how the welfare state and growth are
inter-related. The intuition runs as follows. Initially, a high pre-break growth rate induces
the welfare state to rise at a slightly faster rate than the growth rate of output. This is
because when politicians maximize votes, voter support to politicians depends not only on
the transfers they receive, but also on the rate of output growth. As a consequence, in the
expanding stage of the welfare state, transfer spending drives the growth of the welfare state.
Over time however, a threshold emerges wherein to maintain positive output growth, the
government reduces transfer spending by cutting social welfare expenditure. More speciﬁ-
cally, when growth falls, the welfare state also declines, although at a faster rate than the
reduction in growth. This ultimately creates an upturn in growth. Accordingly, Tanzi and
Schuknecht (1997) show that several industrialized countries that have undertaken reforms
in the size of the public sector to increase economic growth (e.g., Finland, Sweden) have
accomplished this through reductions in public subsidies and transfers.4 This is supported
by our own analysis. Thus, we ﬁnd that regimes which generate low welfare state values
also generates high growth values, while regimes that generates high welfare state values
also generate low growth values. We ﬁnd that the average transition period between both
structural breaks across the nineteen economies is approximately ﬁfteen and a half years.
And ﬁnally, our analysis indicates two separate waves of country-groupings with coin-
ciding break timings in their growth rates. The ﬁrst wave occurs over 1971-1972. The
second wave occurs over 1974-1977. This supports evidence of the inter-relatedness of
4For instance, see Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997, Table 4).ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 7
regime switches where structural breaks in the ﬁrst wave economies aﬀect the incidence
of structural breaks in the second group of economies. In eﬀect, the drag from welfare
state spending in larger economies creates a negative wealth eﬀect in the medium and long
term. One possible channel through which these long term income losses aﬀect the growth
performance of other welfare state economies is by adversely aﬀecting international trade
(Mulas-Granados, 2003).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines a variant of the dynamic model
of growth and the welfare state outlined in Ghate and Zak (2002), and derives the testable
implications of this model. Section 3 outlines a brief motivation for why we use a regime
switching approach to model to test the model. Section 4 presents empirical evidence from
the testable implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model closely follows Ghate and Zak (2002).5 Optimal policies are the solution to
a representative politician’s problem who enacts pro-growth policies and pro-redistributive
policies. A politician’s instantaneous felicity, W, is assumed to be a convex combination
of the welfare of both policies. Hence, W, can be thought of an explicit support function.
The parameter χ ∈ [0,1] measures a politician’s relative preference for pro-redistributive
policies over pro-growth policies. When χ = 0, politician’s derive utility from growth
enhancing policies. When χ = 1, politician’s derive utility from re-distributive policies.
5However, we construct a minor variation to the model proposed by these authors. Here, politician utility
is a convex combination of the utility that individual lobbies derive from the policies implemented for the
groups. The speciﬁcation follows Blomberg (1996).ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 8
Hence, the politician’s objective function is assumed to embody a trade-oﬀ between transfers
and growth.
Following Barro (1990), we assume that pro-growth policies are driven by the level of
public investment, λ, to maximize capital deepening (output growth). Public investment
raises private productivity which in turn raises output and consumption (Aschauer, 1989;
Rioja, 1999). We assume that the utility, V (·), that politicians derive from promoting
pro-growth policies, depends on the rate of capital deepening,
Kt+1
Kt ,w h e r eK denotes the
stock of private capital in the economy. Capital deepening is the proxy for growth in the
economy.
The second aspect in the political decision problem is the value constituents place on
receiving transfers, σ, from politicians, Vσ(σ). The function Vσ(σ) is continuous, strictly
increasing, and concave. Politicians’ preferences for transfers relative to capital growth
are captured by the exogenous parameter χ, with politicians’ value placed on transfers
being χVσ(σ). Higher values of χ indicate a greater inclination by politicians to engage
in re-distribution vis-a-vis productive public investment. When χ = 0, politicians derive
no utility from promoting transfers. We let preferences over transfers be represented by a
power function V (σt)=(  σσ)ν,w i t hν ∈ (0,1).6 The restriction on parameter ν generates
diminishing marginal utility from transfer spending.7
We assume costs associated with bureaucratic waste in administering government in-
vestment projects and transfer programs, given by  λ ∈ (0,1) and  σ ∈ (0,1), respectively.
6The parameter α ∈ (0,1) denotes the share of output paid to capital.
7Later, we will place a regularity condition on ν (ν>
1
2) so that the dynamics of the welfare state from
the theoretical model mimic the cross-country evolution of the welfare state from our sample.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 9
When  λ =1 (  σ = 1), public investment (transfer) programs are administered with no
waste. When  λ < 1(  σ < 1), a fraction of the funds raised for public investment and
transfer programs is lost because of the waste or corruption associated with administer-
ing these programs. Hence,  λλ and  σσ can be interpreted as the eﬀective level of public
investment and transfers, respectively.
Politicians ﬁnance transfers and public investment by levying a proportional tax on
output according to a simple balanced budget rule, Tt = τY,w h e r eτ ∈ (0,1) denotes
the proportional tax rate on output, Y = F(·,·) represents output produced using a neo-
classical production function satisfying the standard conditions, and Tt denotes total tax
revenues at time t. In order to concretize the analysis, we use a Cobb-Douglas production
function F(Kt,  λ ·λt)=Kα
t [ λλt]1−α,f o rα ∈ (0,1). The parameter α denotes the share of
output paid to capital.
Combining the above two objectives of politicians, the ﬁscal policy triple {Tt,σ t,λ t}∞
t=0
is found by solving
MaxT,λ,σW =( 1− χ)
Kt+1
Kt
+ χV (σt)( 1 )
s.t.
Ct = F(Kt,( λλt))(1 − τ)+ σσt − It (2)
It = Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt (3)
Tt = λt + σt, (4)
Equation (2) is the economy’s resource constraint equating consumption, C,t oa f t e rt a x
output, F(·,·)(1 −τ), investment, I, and eﬀective transfers,  σσt. Equation (3) is the stockECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 10
accounting condition for the private capital stock, K,w i t hδ ∈ [0,1] the depreciation rate.
Equation (4) is the government budget constraint equating revenues, Tt, to expenditures
on transfers and public investment, λt + σt,i ne a c hp e r i o d .





This allows us to rewrite the government budget constraint, (4), as
Tt =( 1+θt)λt. (6)
Note that θ proxies for the size of the welfare state in the economy: it denotes the ratio
of real transfer spending to real outlays on public investment (Ghate and Zak, 2002). As
noted before, proxying the welfare state in this manner allows us to examine the size of the
welfare state per “dollar” of productive government spending.
Politicians maximize (1) with respect to λt and θt subject to the constraints (2)-(4)
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Given (11), it is easy to see that,
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which implies that ,
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t = σ 
t + λ 
t. (13)
These optimality conditions reveal the trade-oﬀs faced by policy-makers. Equation (11)
implies that politicians’ optimal level of transfers, grow faster than the capital stock since
ν>0. However, as politicians become less inclined to pursue redistributive policies, i.e.,
χ → 0, equation (11) shows that the politically optimal level of transfers approaches zero.
Equation (12) shows that government investment grows in proportion to the capital stock.
When the capital stock is growing, government investment increases in lock-step, with the
constant of proportionality reduced when the cost of administering this program rises.8
Finally, equation (13) reveals that, due to transfers, taxes grow faster than the capital
stock. This is because a rise in transfers is funded out of higher taxes.
Importantly, equation (10), governs the evolution of the welfare state. In a growing
economy, transfers grow slightly faster than the capital stock but increase proportionately
8Optimal government investment generally falls when the productivity of private capital, α,r i s e sa s
politicians optimally reduce taxes to allocate more revenue to private capital.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 12
with rises in χ, the value given by policy setters to redistribution. However, since public
investment increases lockstep with K, the dynamics of welfare state evolution is pinned
down by the equation for transfers, (11). Hence, in a growing economy, θt,a l s og r o w sf a s t e r
than output. This is because when politicians maximize votes, voter support to politicians
depends not only on the transfers they receive, but also on the rate of output growth. As
a consequence, in the expanding stage of the welfare state, transfer spending drives the
growth of the welfare state. Over time however, a threshold emerges wherein to maintain
positive output growth, the government reduces transfer spending by cutting social welfare
expenditure. Since χ enters into the equation for transfers, an exogenous shift in χ leads
to an exogenous shift in the size of the welfare state. More speciﬁcally, let H denote high,
and L denote low. This implies that a structural break in χ -s a yf r o mχL to χH - induces
a structural break in θ from (10) in period t.
To assess the impact of a rising welfare state on growth, following Solow (1956), we
substitute out the above optimality conditions in the capital market equilibrium condition.
The dynamical system that describes growth in this economy is given by9
Kt+1 = s[GKt − HK
1
1−ν
t ]+( 1− δ)Kt. (14)
where after tax output, denoted by Yt − Tt =[ GKt − HK
1
1−ν
t ]. Deﬁne gt+1 =
Kt+1
Kt to be
the growth rate. Then,




9Here, G ≡ α[ λ(1 − α)]
1−α





1−ν > 0. We also assume a regularity condition
, sα[ λ(1−α)]
1−α
α − δ>0, to ensure that the dynamics are not trivial. This restriction is likely to hold if δ
is suﬃciently small.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 13
Together with equation (10), equation (15) determines the joint evolution of the welfare
state and growth in the economy, respectively.
2.1 Joint Evolution between Growth and the Welfare State
To focus the analysis on the impact of θt on gt+1, since the constant term H depends
positively with
χ






Equations (10), (15), and (16) permit us to see how a structural break from a rise in the
welfare state creates a regime shift in growth
Suppose χ rises from χL to χH. This implies that θt rises from a low welfare state regime
to a high welfare state regime in period t.F u r t h e r ,θ increases slightly faster than capital
since ν>0. We refer to a rising θ relative to output as corresponding to an expansionary
stage of the welfare state. From (15) however, a rise in χ reduces growth, gt+1,i np e r i o d
t + 1. Consequently, growth moves from a high growth regime, gH,t+1,t oal o wg r o w t h
regime, gL,t+1,i np e r i o dt +1 .
The intuition is that a rise in χ,b yr a i s i n gσt, also requires an increase in taxes, Tt.
This reduces disposable income and subsequently investment and capital accumulation. It
is important to note however that a rise in θ in period t does not aﬀect Kt+1 in period t,
but in period t + 1. This is because equation (15) is inter-temporal. This implies that if
the model outlined is correctly speciﬁed, a structural increase in the welfare state should
precede the structural break in growth.10
10To concentrate the analysis around movements in θ inducing movements in the growth rate, we ignoreECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 14
Note that from (15), a reduction in growth leads to a lower capital stock in t +1 . T h i s
reduces transfers, σt+1,i nt i m et+1. However, since transfers fall slightly faster than output
over time (even though public investment falls in proportion to output), this means θ also
falls slightly faster than output over time. From the capital market clearing condition, this
raises disposable income, and therefore growth in period t + 2. We refer to a declining θ
relative to output as corresponding to a contractionary stage of the welfare state. In other
words, in the contractionary stages of the welfare state, a reduction in θ leads to higher
growth over time.
Figure (1) describes the dynamic impact of regime switches in the welfare state to regime
switches in the growth rate given by equations (15) and (10). Initially, a high growth regime
funds a growing welfare state. This leads to a high growth-growing welfare state. However,
since a rise in transfers requires taxes to rise from (13), the drag created by higher taxes
on disposable income reduces capital accumulation and growth.11 Hence, our theoretical
analysis is consistent with macroeconomic performance of welfare state economies outlined
in the introduction, i,e., in the long run, growth is aﬀected adversely because higher welfare
state spending is ﬁnanced by higher taxation which generates economic ineﬃciency (Lind-
beck et al, 1994; OECD, 1994 a,b; Atkinson and Werner-Sinn, 1999; Ghate and Zak, 2002).
the possibility that the other constant parameters in the model can induce a structural break in growth.
This is for three reasons. First, it is a well known fact that α, the share of income paid to capital, is constant.
Second, the constant savings assumption has solid empirical support (Campbell and Mankiw, 1991; Blinder
and Deaton, 1985). Finally, we assume that  λ and  σ are suﬃciently small to not impact the aggregate
dynamics of the economy.
11The condition for balanced growth obtains by evaluating
dKt+1
dKt > 1. When χ  =0 ,χ → 1 implies that
Tt →∞from (13), or limTt→∞Y = 0. In contrast, when χ = 0, transfers are set to zero, which implies after
tax output is linear in capital, i.e. Y = Y − Tt = α{(1 − α) λ}
1−α
α Kt.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 15
It is also important to note that when growth falls, the welfare state also declines, although
at a faster rate than the reduction in growth. This ultimately creates an upturn in growth.
Insert Figure (1) Here.
Finally, note from (14), as χ → 1( o rH →∞ ), a higher propensity for redistribution
on the part of policy makers leads to output falling to zero in the long run. This is because
a higher propensity to re-distribute increases the taxes required to fund transfers reducing
after tax output. In contrast, when χ =0( o rH → 0) , endogenous growth obtains and the
economy grows on a balanced growth path. The after depreciation growth rate, or the net
rate of growth is given by sG−δ. Hence, the value of χ determines the aggregate dynamics
of the economy.12
3 EMPIRICAL SETUP
3.1 Motivation for Markov Switching Approach
To test the model outlined in Section 2, we employ a Markov regime switching model
along the lines of Hamilton (1989). Before outlining the testable hypothesis however, we
brieﬂy detail the importance of using a Markov regime approach.
First, using a regime switching approach allows us to compute the mean values (of
growth rates) in diﬀerent regimes as well as the probabilities of moving from a high growth
to low growth regime (or low welfare state to high welfare state regime). Also, to the best of
our knowledge, using a regime switching approach to assess welfare state-economic growth
12Matsuyama (1999) constructs a similar model in which factor accumulation and innovation capture
diﬀerent phases of a single growth experience.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 16
dynamics is new in the literature. Hence, our model proposes a new modeling strategy for
assessing the joint non-linear impact of growth and welfare state evolution assuming that
the timing of structural breaks are unknown.
Second, using a regime switching framework allows us to bypass the well-known problems
associated with an ex-ante selection of the timing of structural change. This is because the
date of the structural change is not deﬁned under the null-hypothesis. This implies that
the standard testing theory is not applicable (Hansen, 2001).
Third, an assessment of the impact of ﬁscal policy on economic growth based on linear
regressions does not provide economically plausible and statistically signiﬁcant results. This
is because the relation between ﬁscal policy and growth may be non-linear with the ﬁscal
and growth variables jointly endogenous. While a solution to the joint endogeneity problem
would be to use exogenous instrumental variables to proxy for various regressors, because
of the multiplicity of possible regressors, the inﬂuence of one variable on growth does not
necessarily imply that other variables do not aﬀect growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993;
Brons, de Groot, and Nijkamp, 1999). Likewise, using simple linear regressions can lead to
serious model mis-speciﬁcation.13 To see this graphically, a hypothetical structural break
in growth induced by a rise in the welfare state is depicted in Figure (2). Both variables, g
(growth), and, θ (measure of welfare state), are generated by two regimes. The causal link
between g and θ exists if the regimes that generate them overlap.14 However, any inference
13Having said this, using a-priori speciﬁed non-linear models does not fully solve the problem since the
results are sensitive to the assumptions on model structure.
14If the transition in θ is smooth and long lasting, regimes with high growth and low welfare states and
low growth and high welfare states may not overlap. However, this does not mean that we cannot draw
conclusions on the joint dynamics between growth and the welfare state.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 17
on the direction of causation is not restricted a-priori by a pre-speciﬁed linear or non-linear
function. This means that variable movements depend only on their regimes.
Insert Figure (2) Here.
Fourth, a conceptual diﬃculty with using standard growth regressions is the multiplicity
of explanations (Durlauf and Quah, 1998; Durlauf, 2000). This leads to a large set of
potential explanatory variables.15 This points to one of the advantages of using a regime
switching model: we focus exclusively on the variables that drive the dynamics of the
theoretical model.
And ﬁfth, several cross-country empirical studies assume that the statistical model is
invariant across investigated units (countries). This assumption - often referred to as para-
meter homogeneity - is usually a strong assumption to justify. For example, it is diﬃcult to
justify that a 1% change in school enrollment has the same eﬀect on growth in two countries
like the US and Botswana (Durlauf, 2000). Sorting countries into groups does not solve
parameter heterogeneity as country groupings are typically ad hoc with few alternative
groupings.
We proceed by ﬁrst analyzing all the variables of interest within the Hamilton (1989)
framework. Inference on the behavior of each series is then used as a benchmark for ana-
lyzing the dynamics and causal links between the expenditure structure and growth.
15For instance, Durlauf (2000) and Durlauf and Quah (1998) report over ninety diﬀerent variables as
potential explanations for standard growth variation.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 18
3.2 Testable Implications
The model in Section 2, the joint evolution of the welfare state and growth given by
Figure (1), and equations (10), (15), and (16) lead to the following testable implications.16
The testable implications attempt to characterize the joint endogenity of welfare state and
growth evolution.
• In the expansionary stages of the welfare state, ↑ growth →↑ θ. Hence, high growth
regimes are associated with a high welfare state regime.
However subsequently, expanding welfare state regimes are associated with low
growth regimes: ↑ θ →↓ growth.
• In the contractionary stages of the welfare state, ↓ growth → θ ↓. Hence, lower growth
regimes are associated with a low welfare state regime.
However subsequently, contracting welfare state regimes are associated with high
growth regimes:↓ θ →↑ growth.
• A regime switch inducing structural break in θ precedes the structural break in the
growth: i.e., an upward structural break in θ induces a structural break to a lower
growth regime.
• A regime switch inducing structural break in growth precedes the structural break
in the θ: i.e., a downward structural break in growth induces a downward structural
break in θ.
16To ensure that the model matches the key features of the data, we assume that ν>
1
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• The joint evolution between growth and the welfare state is non-linear.
3.3 Data Description
We test the above using the CWS data-set compiled by Huber, Ragin, and Stephens
(1994), as well as the IFS and OECD datasets.17 The sample encompasses data for nine-
teen welfare states economies. These are Australia (AUL), Austria (AU), Belgium (BEL),
Canada (CAN), Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Ireland
(IRE), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), Luxembourg (LUX), Netherlands (NET), New Zealand
(NZL), Norway ((NOR), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWZ), United Kingdom (UK) and
United States (US).
However, due to the lack of complete data on transfers and public investment over 1950-
2000, the welfare state variable, θ, starts only from 1960. In contrast, our analysis of regime
switches in RGDP starts from 1950. Growth rates of RGDP are computed as diﬀerences
of logs of total constant prices GDP. As the raw data contain business and political cycle
factors irrelevant for long run output movements, a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter is run on both
RGDP and θ.
17Annual data on RGDP are obtained from the IFS. Annual data on real outlays on public investments
and real transfers come from the IFS , CWS, and OECD databases. The variable θ for DEN and LUX are
deﬁned as the ratio of total real transfers to gross domestic investment as there is insuﬃcient data available
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Structural Breaks in Growth Rates
As stated in the introduction and shown in Figure (2), we ﬁrst analyze all the variables
of interest within the Markov regime framework. Inferences on the behavior of each series is
then used as a benchmark for analyzing the dynamics and causal links between the welfare
state and growth. To analyze structural breaks in the growth rates, we follow Hamilton
(1989), as discussed in Appendix A. The RGDP growth series is decomposed into two
stochastic trends corresponding to two regimes over 1950-2001: one that generates high
growth and one that generates low growth rates. Table (1) summarizes the results for the
investigated countries.
As Table (1) indicates, a majority of countries experience a growth slowdown in the mid
1970’s, with average growth rates equal to 5.07% prior to the structural break, and 2.29%
after the structural break. The net change in growth rates across all nineteen economies
is - 2.78%. The highest pre-break growth rates are observed in Japan and Germany with
growth rates of 9.33% and 7.09%, respectively. These countries also record the biggest
(net) slowdown in the post-break period, -6.64% and -4.32%, respectively. Switzerland and
Norway are the slowest growing economies after the break - growing at an average rate of
1.56% and 1.76%, respectively. Further, the direction of change in growth is opposite in
Ireland and Luxembourg: for these economies the average post-break rate exceeds the pre-ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 21
break growth rate.18 Evidence for Norway and New Zealand shows that these economies
experience two breaks - one indicating a growth slowdown (Norway in 1980 and New Zealand
in 1974) - and the second an upturn in growth (Norway in 1994 and New Zealand 1954).
The identiﬁcation of these breaks is consistent with several public sector reforms enacted
by both countries, but especially with New Zealand. We detail the case of New Zealand in
more detail later. Finally, the model does not identify a break for United Kingdom (UK).
This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Ben-David and Papell (1998): i.e., the UK
economy grew at an average of 2.68% - a growth rate substantially lower than the growth
average for the high growth regime averages (5.07%), and closer to the average growth rates
across the low growth regime (2.29%).
Table (1) also allows us to distinguish groups of countries with coinciding break timings.
This identiﬁes groups of economies whose growth rates are inﬂuenced by structural declines
in the growth rates of groups of other economies. For instance, the ﬁrst wave of coun-
tries that experience a downward regime switch in growth encompass the Germany (1971),
United States (1972), Japan (1972), and Switzerland (1972). The three big economies - US,
Germany and Japan - could be regarded as engines of growth for other countries as growth
in these economies aﬀects the growth performance of other welfare state economies.19 The
second wave of regime switches occur over 1974-1977: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Australia
and New Zealand over 1974-1975; Belgium and Netherlands over 1975 -1976; and Austria,
18As we will see later, Ireland’s lower pre-break and higher post-break growth rate is only partially con-
sistent with the theoretical model because of ﬁscal reforms enacted over the 1983-1994 period.
19The relatively early break for Switzerland could be explained by the fact that it is a small economy
outside of the EU institutional apparatus.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 22
Country Pre-break Post -break Change: Structural break
growth rate growth rate -slowdown
(%) (%) +upturn
AU 5.4 2.34 -3.06 1977
AUL 5.32 2.81 -2.51 1975
BEL 4.33 2.04 -2.29 1975
CAN 5.18 2.38 -2.8 1977
DEN 4.3 1.89 -2.41 1975
FIN 5.25 2.74 -2.51 1975
FRA 5.25 2.03 -3.22 1977
GER 7.09 2.77 -4.32 1971
IRE 3.67 8.26 +4.59 1992
ITA 6.1 2.69 -3.41 1977
JAP 9.33 2.69 -6.64 1972
LUX 6.16 3.95 2.21 1985
NET 5.53 2.29 -3.24 1976
NOR 4.29 1.76 -2.53, +2.53 1980, 1994
NZL 3.81 1.79 -2.02, +2.02 1974, 1954
SWE 3.09 2.06 -1.03 1974
SWZ 5.21 1.56 -3.65 1972
UK 2.68 0.26 – only ﬁrst regime was recorded
US 4.02 2.37 -1.65 1972
AVERAGE 5.07* 2.29* ** -2.78
∗ Excluding Luxembourg and Ireland.
∗∗ Including UK growth equal to 2.68 %.
In IRE(1992), LUX(1985), and NOR(1994), the direction of growth change was opposite:
the post-break growth rate was higher and the break occured later.
Table 1: Identification of Structural Breaks in Economic GrowthECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 23
France, Italy, and Canada with growth breaks in 1977. In eﬀect, the drag from welfare state
spending in larger economies creates a negative wealth eﬀect in the medium and long term.
This appears to aﬀect the growth performance of other welfare state countries.20
In summary, Table (1) indicates that the early 1970’s is an important turning point for
many industrialized economies. This constitutes our ﬁrst ﬁnding. Hence, the implication
of our results are that the average pre-break growth rates exceed the average post-break
growth rates. The incidence of growth slow-downs for developed countries is also consistent
with the many ﬁndings of post-war divergence in income levels across developed economies
themselves. In the interest of economizing on space, we plot the evolution of RGDP rates
in three “representative” economies as shown in Figures (3), (5), and (7). These ﬁgures
correspond to Finland, France, and Sweden, respectively.21 These countries are representa-
tive because the RGDP series for several of the other countries analyzed using the Markov
switching framework conforms to the pattern of thresholds in growth illustrated in these
graphs.22
We now assess the welfare state series.
4.2 Structural Breaks in The Welfare State
Our analysis of the welfare state variable θ conﬁrms the prediction from the theory that
the welfare state evolves in a logistic pattern for most analyzed countries. This constitutes
20International trade is a possible channel through which long term income losses in larger welfare state
economies aﬀects the growth performance of smaller welfare state economies (Mulas-Granados, 2003).
21The graphs for the remaining countries are available from the authors on request.
22See Appendix A for a formal treatment of the regime switching approach.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 24
our second ﬁnding. Consistent with the previous section, we plot the evolution of the welfare
state corresponding to the RGDP ﬁgures for Finland, France, and Sweden. These are given
by Figures (4), (6), and (8), respectively. As these ﬁgures show, applying the Hamilton
model with two regimes - corresponding to slow and fast welfare state growth - enables
identiﬁcation of three characteristic periods of welfare state behavior. The ﬁrst regime is
a period in which the welfare state grows slowly when it is at a low level (period 1). The
second regime is a period in which the welfare state grows rapidly in the transition period
(period 2). The third regime is a period in which the welfare state grows slowly again
although at a higher level than the size that the welfare state attained after the transition
period (period 3). For instance, this can be seen in the case of Sweden in Figure (8). The
model identiﬁes 1968 as the ﬁrst regime switch to a high welfare state regime, and then
the late eighties - early nineties as a reversion to a lower welfare state regime. As will
be discussed later, as the welfare state falls in Sweden, (decreasing θ), there is a growing
probability of higher growth, as can be seen for the years 1998-99 in Figure (7). This is
consistent with the growth dynamics induced by a declining welfare state regime outlined in
the last testable implication of the previous section: to wit, since the decline in the welfare
state exceeds the reduction in growth, ultimately, there is an upturn in growth.
INSERT Figures (3), (5), and (7).
INSERT Figures (4), (6), and (8).
Table (2) conﬁrms that most countries analyzed experienced two structural breaks in
θ. We also ﬁnd that the average transition period between both structural breaks acrossECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 25
Country % Change in Welfare State* Struc. Breaks 1,2,(3) Length of Transition Period**
AU First Break Only 1993, – –
AUL 152.4 1971,1984 13
BEL First Break Only 1977, – –
CAN 161.3 1966,1982 16
DEN 100 1972,1983, (1989) 11.6
FIN 180.1 1972,1996 24
FRA 71.5 1971,1983 12
GER 80.7 1972,1984, (1992) 12.8
IRE First Break Only 1980, – –
ITA Opp. Direction of Breaks 1970,1988, (1997) –
JAP 131.3 1972,1987, (1996) 15
LUX Second Break Only – , 1981 –
NET 218.7 1970,1985 15
NOR 79.9 1970,1986 16
NZL 239.0 1973,1993 20
SWE 179.0 1968,1986 18
SWZ 78.7 1969,1984 15
UK 261.3 1971,1985 14
US Second Break only – , 1980 –
∗Beginning and End of Transition Period, HP Values.
∗∗In Years
Table 2: Identification of Structural Breaks in the Welfare State
the sample lasts for 15.5 years. For instance, the process of welfare state growth begins
earlier in Canada (1966) and Sweden (1968) than in the other countries. The UK and New
Zealand exhibit the most stark increases in the welfare state:growing by 261 % and 239%,
respectively. Finally, there are four economies with three structural breaks in θ:D e n m a r k ,
Germany, Japan and Italy. We later discuss why Germany and Japan should be regardedECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 26
as special cases.23
4.3 Discussion of Results
A detailed description of individual countries is presented in Table (3). For twelve
countries - Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland - the empirical evidence surrounding θ
conﬁrms the co-evolution of growth and the welfare state described by equations (10) and
(15), as well as Figure (1). Further, for Luxembourg, while the direction of structural
breaks in growth and the welfare state are in the opposite direction, the joint dynamics
are still consistent with the theory (a decrease in the welfare state variable, θ,l e a d st o
higher growth).24 Figures (3) and (4), (5) and (6), and (7) and (8) oﬀer three set of
representative diagrams of growth starts and breaks for these twelve countries. In each,
the ﬁrst structural break in the welfare state variable, θ, precedes the structural break in
growth. In other words, for the economies listed above, the empirical evidence support the
testable implications outlined in Section 3: i.e., that regimes that generate low θ values are
associated with regimes that generate high growth rates, while regimes that generate high
θ values also generate low growth regimes. This constitutes our third ﬁnding. We now look
at certain countries in detail to verify whether the broader institutional reforms enacted by
these countries predict the break points identiﬁed in the economic growth and welfare state
series by the Markov switching framework above.25
23The third structural break in θ in Denmark is caused by decreasing private investment (there is no
disaggregated data on public investments available). For this reason, we discuss this amongst the countries
with two structural breaks. The directions of structural breaks in θ in Italy are opposite from the other four
economies.
24This is consistent with the last testable implication outline in the previous section.
25The choice of country groupings is consistent with the emphasis given to certain countries in the welfareECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 27
Sweden and Finland. As can be seen for Finland and Sweden from Figures (3)-(4), and (7)
and (8), respectively, the joint dynamics of welfare state and growth thresholds are very
similar. In particular, we consider the joint evolution between growth and the welfare state
in Sweden to constitute strong evidence for the theoretical model. To wit, both Sweden and
Finland faced high public debt, high unemployment, and low growth in the early 1990’s.
To tackle these, in addition to institutional reforms, both countries mainly targeted social
security spending in their reform agenda (OECD 1994a,b; Lindbeck et al, 1994). Amongst
several reforms, Sweden reduced the replacement ratio for unemployment beneﬁts, changed
the indexation of pensions, and reduced child allowances and family support (Lindbeck et
al, 1994). Finland raised the retirement age as part of its pension reform, reduced health
insurance beneﬁts, and curtailed producer subsidies and employment of local governments.
The end eﬀect was that both governments cut public spending by 4 % of GDP between
1993 and 1995. For instance, as can be seen in Figure (4) – which depicts the incidence
of structural breaks in the welfare state variable θ for Finland – the probability of moving
to a contracting welfare state regime from an expanding welfare state regime rises in the
1994-1995 period. Similarly, for the case of Sweden in Figure (8), the probability of moving
to a contracting welfare state regime from an expanding welfare state regime rises in the
late eighties and early nineties.26 Accordingly, in the Swedish case, the probability of the
high growth regime has been increasing since 1996, which is consistent with the theory:
state reform literature. For instance, see Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997) and Mulas-Granados (2003).
26Lindbeck et al (1994, p. 98) documents the enormous size in public spending in Sweden since 1950. To
wit, public spending has grown from approximately 25 % of GDP in the early 1950’s to 70 % in the early
1990’s. Both transfer payments and public consumption have led this expansion. The number of public
employees has increased from fewer than 500,000 in 1960 to about 1,600,000 in 1993.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 28
i.e., a result of the welfare reforms enacted in the late eighties and early nineties which led
to declining growth rates in the welfare state. While we do not discuss the case of France
explicitly, similar patterns are discernible in the structural breaks governing France’s growth
rates. However, the diﬀerence between Finland on the one hand, and France and Sweden
on the other hand, is the shorter transition period taken in France and Sweden taken to
revert back to the low growth welfare state regime again (approximately 20 years in Finland
versus 10 years in France and 15 years in Sweden).
New Zealand. Our model also supports the joint dynamics of welfare state and growth
thresholds in countries with two growth structural breaks, like New Zealand. Since 1994,
New Zealand has adopted a Fiscal Responsibility Act that clearly deﬁned the rules and
objectives of ﬁscal policy. Further by 1994, public sector spending had declined by 10%
of GDP compared to 1988. This reduction was almost exclusively achieved by cuts in
transfers and subsidies (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997). These reforms are consistent with
our ﬁndings for New Zealand in Table (2): our identiﬁcation of a second structural break
for θ in New Zealand is in 1993. In contrast, during the seventies and eighties, New Zealand
was a highly protectionist economy (Scott, 1996). From Table (2), this is consistent with
the identiﬁcation of an expanding welfare state regime in New Zealand in 1973. However,
between 1984 and the mid 1990’s New Zealand’s reforms exhaustive reforms – which covered
state enterprises, agriculture, the tax system, social policy reform, health, education, and
pension beneﬁts – created the conditions for higher economic growth in the mid 1990’s.27
27See Scott (1996) and Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997) for more details on the various reform elements in
New Zealand.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 29
INSERT Figures () and ()
Some other countries. The remaining countries in this group follow a similar pattern of
breaks and starts although with varying transition periods. These transition periods are
outlined in Table (2). For instance, in the case of Australia, extensive government spending,
lasting from the beginning of the 1970’s, was curtailed in the mid 1980’s, with a stabilization
plan launched to correct for both internal and external balances. This consolidation mainly
encompassed adjustments in the government wage bill and cuts in transfer programs.
In Canada, after a long period of public spending throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s,
a ﬁscal stabilization program was enacted in the ﬁrst half of the 1980’s. The Canadian
government cut the government wage bill, leaving social spending virtually unchanged.
However, the expansion of the Canadian economy in 1982 triggered a re-orientation in the
structure of Canadian public expenditures, making welfare state spending grow slower.
In Denmark, in 1982, a new right-wing government launched a ﬁscal stabilization pro-
gram, with the adjustment equally divided between spending cuts and tax increases. On
the spending side, the welfare cuts were broad ranging, but focused strongly on unemploy-
ment insurance and the pension system (OECD 1994a, 1994b). During 1983-1986, there
were also reductions in redistributive transfers to local governments. On the revenue side,
the increases were on direct taxes for households and businesses, with modest increases in
indirect taxes.
Finally, in the case of Luxembourg, the direction of θ and growth switches are opposite
than in the rest of countries but still consistent with the theory - a decrease in welfare stateECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 30
growth leads to higher growth.
UK and USA. While the UK and USA don’t directly support the model, the broad pattern
of growth and welfare state evolution is consistent with the theoretical model. Hence, they
deserve some elaboration. For the UK, the ﬁrst structural break in θ in 1971 is not followed
by a structural break in growth. One possible explanation for this is because transfer and
subsidy spending as a percentage of GDP was already low in the UK compared to other
countries such as Ireland, Finland, Belgium, and Sweden (OECD 1994a,b; Ghate and Zak,
2002). Further, while the mid 1980 privatization reforms reduced public spending, public
expenditure crept up again rapidly in the 1990’s. To wit, public expenditure was only 2%
below its previous peak in 1983 and subsidies and transfers were higher in 1994 before
the Thatcher reforms. In contrast, for the US, we do not ﬁnd evidence of a statistically
signiﬁcant rise in θ even though the model predicts a structural decline in growth starting
in 1972. This is broadly consistent with the decline in growth and total factor productivity
dated to 1971 in the US, with one possible factor being inadequate public investment in
infrastructure (Aschauer, 1989).28
Thus, our results closely match the country-speciﬁc anecdotal experience with institu-
28As can be veriﬁed from Table (1) and Table (2), for three countries - Austria, Belgium, and Ireland - we
do not ﬁnd evidence of a rise in θ preceding the structural break in growth. Even though Belgium achieved
a substantial reduction in public expenditures between 1983 and 1994, the ﬁscal reform package after the
early 1990’s only led to marginal changes in ﬁscal expenditures (OECD 1994a,b). This may explain why
our analysis doesn’t capture a second structural break for the welfare state variable θ. Likewise, Ireland’s
reform program between 1983-1994 was subsequently accompanied by a rebound in economic growth with
reductions in subsidies and transfers taking on the bulk of Ireland’s ﬁscal adjustment. Other reforms included
a reduction in housing and producer subsidies, tightening of eligibility for social security beneﬁts, and freezing
the real value of social beneﬁts. However, even though we don’t ﬁnd evidence for Ireland (due to the lack
of an exhaustive time series for Irish welfare state spending), the direction of the impact of Ireland’s ﬁscal
reforms on its post-break growth is consistent with the theoretical model, and predicted by Table (1).ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 31
Country Welfare State Growth Welfare State Evidence for Model
Str. break 1 Str. break Str. break 2, (3)
AU 1993 1977 – No evidence
AUL 1971 1975 1984 Evidence
BEL – 1975 1977 No evidence
CAN 1966 1977 1982 Evidence
DEN 1972 1975 1983 Evidence
FIN 1972 1975 1996 Evidence
FRA 1971 1977 1983 Evidence
GER 1972 1971 1984,(1992) Evidence. 3 breaks.
IRE 1980 1992 No evidence
ITA 1970 1977 1988,(1997) No evidence (opposite direction of
breaks in θ )
JAP 1972 1972, 1993 1987,(1996) Evidence. 3 breaks
Model recognizes the second break in
growth in 1993. Cannot be
directly attributed to θ.
LUX 1981 1985 – Evidence(a decrease in θ growth leads to
higher growth)
NET 1970 1976 1985 Evidence
NOR 1970 1980, 1994 1986 Evidence
NZL 1973 1974 1993 Evidence
SWE 1968 1974 1986 Evidence
SWZ 1969 1972 1984 Evidence
UK 1971 - 1985 –
US – 1972 – –
Table 3: Evidence for the Model.
tional reform, its bearing on structural changes in the size of the welfare state, and the
impact of such reforms on the growth experience of our sample economies.
4.4 Three Structural Breaks in the Welfare State: Further
Evidence
For three countries - Germany, Japan, and Italy - the welfare state series exhibits three
structural breaks. The joint dynamics of welfare state evolution and growth is also consistentECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 32
with the theoretical model. From these countries, we focus on the cases of Germany and
Japan, as they deserve some elaboration. Figures (9)-(10) and (11)-(12), relating to Japan
and Germany, respectively, summarize the dynamics of growth and the welfare state.
INSERT Figures (9) and (10)
INSERT Figures (11) and (12)
Japan. Figure (9) shows that the forecasted probability of staying in a high growth regime
declines around 1972, even though growth remains impressive until 1993. However, the time
trend of θ identiﬁes three distinct periods of welfare state growth: 1974-1986, 1987-1996,
and 1997 onwards. In the 1974-1988 period, the forecasted probability of staying in the low
growth welfare state regime drops to zero. Further, this probability increases (approximates
1) only around 1988, when there is a structural break in the trend growth rate of the welfare
state. The forecasted probability of staying in a low welfare state regime however drops
again to zero around 1998, as θ begins to rise.29 What drives the increase in θ in Japan after
1995 however are reductions in real outlays in public investment (Land, Infrastructure, and
Transportation Ministry, Report, 2000). This provides one possibility for the structural rise
in θ in Japan: a concerted drive to reduce outlays on public investments in the late nineties.
Germany. We consider Germany to be an interesting case. Germany, like Japan, also
exhibits three structural breaks in θ. The model however identiﬁes only one structural
break in the growth rate (in 1971). As Figure (12) shows, the forecasted probability of
staying in a low welfare state regime drops to zero in the 1975-1977 period, rises back to
29Until 1993, Japan RGDP growth has been 0.79 %. This is the number we obtain from running the
Hamilton model on growth rates for the sample after the ﬁrst break.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 33
1 during the 1983-1993 period and then drops down to zero again in the post 1993 period.
Accordingly, Germany shifted to a generous system of retirement subsidies in 1972 (ﬁrst
break - see Table 2), which were reduced in 1982, with the growth eﬀects emerging in 1984
(second break). However, the rise in social spending in uniﬁed Germany got a boost once
West Germany’s social security became fully extended to East Germany in the early nineties
(third break). Thus, the structural increase in θ since 1993 possibly reﬂects the increase in
transfers to East Germany related to uniﬁcation and the inability of Germany to undertake
adequate labor market reforms. It remains to be seen whether the structural rise in θ will
dampen the economic growth in Germany in the future.30
5 Conclusion
This paper undertakes an empirical test of the model of economic growth and the welfare
state developed by Ghate and Zak (2002). By using a Hamilton regime switching model on
an exhaustive list of welfare state economies, our main ﬁnding is that structural breaks in
the growth rate of several welfare state economies can be attributed to a structural break in
the trend growth of the welfare state variable. We identify the general intuition behind the
co-evolution between growth and the welfare state is as follows: initially, a high pre-break
growth rate induces the welfare state to rise. Over time, a growing welfare state leads to a
decline in growth. In the long run, lower growth dampens the growth of the welfare state.
This is because higher taxes are required to fund a growing welfare state leading to long run
income losses. In other words, regimes that generate low welfare state values also generate
30The model did not identify a growth break so far. Although in 2001, Germany enacted a pension reform
plan (known as the ‘Riester’ reform).ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 34
high growth values, while regimes that generates high welfare state values also generate low
growth values. We ﬁnd that the early seventies is an important turning point for many
welfare state economies. We also ﬁnd that the average transition period across the nineteen
economies between both structural breaks is approximately ﬁfteen and a half years. We
also ﬁnd that in several economies, as predicted by the model, the structural break in the
time trend of welfare state growth precedes the structural break in growth rates. However,
reductions in economic growth are associated with lower values of the welfare state as lower
growth forces politicians to cut transfers and taxes. The dynamic feedback process between
growth and the welfare state illustrates the joint endogeneity and non-linearity of both
variables, and the implications each has for the time trend of development.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 35
6 APPENDIX A
This discussion follows Hamilton (1989). Consider the stochastic process,
˜ yt = nt +˜ zt, (17)
where ˜ yt is the dependent variable, nt is a Markov trend following
nt = µ(st)+nt−1 = α0 + α1st + nt−1, (18)
st ∈{ 0,1} denotes a regime variable with transition probability matrix
P =





and ˜ zt is a random component. Each observation of the dependent variables is drawn from
one of two distributions: the ﬁrst m1 observations are generated by regime 0, the next m2
from regime 1, and so on. It is important to note that each mi,∀i ∈ 1,2...M (where M is
denotes the total number of switching points) is unknown. We assume that ˜ zt follows an
ARIMA(r,1,0) process where,
˜ zt − ˜ zt−1 = ϕ1(˜ zt−1 − ˜ zt−2)+ϕ2(˜ zt−2 − ˜ zt−3)+.... + ϕr(˜ zt−r − ˜ zt−r−1)+ t, (20)
with E( t)=0 ,Va r( t)=σ2,a n dCov( t,  t+k) = 0. Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of equation
(17) and substituting yt =˜ yt − ˜ yt−1 and zt =˜ zt − ˜ zt−1 implies
yt = α0 + α1st + zt. (21)
Since yt is observable, our objective is to estimate the transition probabilities across states,
the parameters α0 and α1 (denoting the mean level of yt in both regimes), and the variances
of their random components.ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE STATE 36
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